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Worker Killed in Wood-dust Fire Sparked by Faulty Fuse
Oregon Case Report
Summary
On August 11, 2003, a 50-year-old production worker was seriously
burned, and died 5 days later, from a fire that resulted when
wood dust exploded at a wood-flour mill. On the previous day,
the worker was shown a makeshift fuse that had been installed
in the fuse box. A nonrenewable cartridge fuse had been repaired
by taping a renewable fuse element to the outside. The worker
pulled out the fuse and inspected it, then replaced it in the
fuse box. On the day of the incident, an explosion occurred when
the worker started up the machines in the mill for the morning
shift. The makeshift fuse generated a spark on startup, which
ignited wood dust that had settled in the fuse box. The first
explosion raised clouds of dust, which also exploded. At least
three explosions in succession carried the fire to the adjacent
storage area where the production worker was standing alone. He
sustained second- and third-degree burns to his upper body and
arms, and breathed toxic, superheated air. When the local fire
department arrived, the victim was awake, alert, and oriented.
He was transported to a local hospital, and transferred to the
Oregon Burn Center for treatment, where he later died.
Introduction
On August 11, 2003, a 50-year-old production worker was seriously
burned, and died 5 days later, from a fire that resulted when
stored wood flour exploded at a wood-flour mill. OR-FACE was notified
of the incident on August 19, 2003. An OR-FACE investigator interviewed
the fire department battalion chief and deputy fire marshal in
person on August 27, 2003. A registered consulting engineer with
a mechanical specialty conducted an investigation for the insurer.
Oregon OSHA also investigated the incident. This report is based
on materials obtained from fire authorities, plus reports from
the insurance investigation, OR-OSHA, and the medical examiner.
The employer is a wood-flour mill that grinds paper-mill waste
into a fine powder, and bags and stores it as a marketable product
for a variety of industrial applications. The building where the
incident occurred was built to older construction standards, and
not for the purpose for which it was presently used. A structural
modification violated the National Electrical Code (Class II/Div.
1) by exposing the fuse-panel room to combustible dust. In addition,
a rubber seal on the fuse box intended to prevent dust from penetrating
the box was not in place. Most of the electrical equipment in
the factory was old and not up to code, making replacement parts
difficult to obtain. The general manager, located in another state,
was aware of the antiquated equipment at the mill, but was unaware
of applicable safety regulations. The last documented safety inspection
at the mill was in 2000.
Three employees worked at the mill, running two shifts at the
time of the incident. The employees had worked together at the
mill for 9 years. They did not maintain a safety program, or perform
safety training or routine inspections to identify hazards related
to the building, machinery, or operations. None were trained in
applicable safety regulations that apply to wood-flour manufacturing.
All three workers made repairs to equipment, including electrical
equipment, for which they were not specifically trained or supervised.
One year prior to this incident, a worker was killed in a similar
explosion and fire at an adjacent wood-products factory. Dust
explosions are a known hazard in wood-products and other organic
materials manufacturing that produce dust particles.
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